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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants agree with the amplification of the 
3tatement of Facts contained in Respondents' Brief (hereafter 
11 Res?. Br."). 
ARGUMENT 
POic!T I. THE CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO GRANT THE VARIANCE. 
In the Brief of Appellants (hereafter "App. Br."), 
Apoellants demonstrated that the City lacked authority to grant 
t~e variance in question on the basis of at least three 
t~~ependent grounds: a) the variance violated the spirit of the 
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zoning ordinance; bl the pro?erty lacks any special 
circumstances; and cl Richardson suffers from no unnecessary 
hardships and difficulties. 
Respondents failed to even address the first and most 
important ground for reversal. Point IA of Appellants' Brief 
explained in detail why a reduction in lot size such as the one 
Richardson obtained from Smithfield violates the spirit of the 
Smithfield City Ordinance. That proposition was supported by 
ample statutory authority and interpretive case law from Utah and 
other Jurisdictions. Respondents did not (nor could they) deny 
that the basic harmony with the spirit of the zoning ordinance is 
an essential aspect of any variance. Respondents did not deny 
that this variance in fact violated the spirit of the Smithfield 
City Zoning Ordinance. Their failure to deal with the issues 
raised in Point IA of Appellants' Brief should be taken as a 
concession that the argument and supporting authority contained 
therein are accurate. 
Appellants' second major substantive point was that the 
Richardson property had no legally cognizable special 
circumstances attached to it: (App. Br. 111. Respondents again 
failed to even address this point in their brief, and that 
failure should be taken as an admission that the variance fails 
to cieet the requirements of Section 10-9-12 ( 3 I (bl, Utah Code 
Anr.otated. 
The great bulk cf Respondents' Brie~ en the substanti~e 
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Br1ance issues addresses ";:iractical difficulties" vs. 
"unnecessary ~ardships" tests, the self-imposed hardship doctrine 
~nj standards of review. All of these arguments miss the basic 
-01~t of Appellants' Brief, which is the failure of this variance 
:o comply with Utah Statutory standards, the most vital and basic 
cf which is observance of the spirit of zoning ordinances. 
The "practical difficulties" and/or "unnecessary 
1ardship" portion of the statutory test for variance ~ 
addressed by Respondents, but their arguments are misplaced in 
light of Utah Code Section 10-9-12 (3) (a), and in any case, they 
have failed to show~ legally significant "hardship" or 
"difficulty" suffered by Richardson. 
Respondents devote great attention in their brief to 
distinguishing between the "practical difficulties" standard and 
the "unnecessary hardship" test, and they urge upon the Court the 
adoption of the less stringent "practical difficulties" test, 
especially in cases such as the present one where they claim an 
"area" variance is used. T'.1eir argument fails because the Utah 
Statute establishes the test to be employed as "difficulties and 
'\ardships." Section 10-9-12(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated (emphasis 
added). Respondents admit that the "practical difficulties" 
standard they urge is to be found "in many state statutes" (Resp. 
~r. 10). This Court should adhere to and a;:iply the clear language 
)f the applicable Utah Statute and reject Respondents' attempt to 
~a?e the Court ado;:it a foreign statutory standard. 
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l\nother reason Respondents' :iro::iosed test shoulc' he 
rejected is that the more deman~1ng ''unnecessary hardshi~ 11 tesl 
would never be applied. T;-,ey argue that "it is only logical to 
assume a less stringent standard for an area variance." They 
cite to a Delaware case construing a statute which makes an 
express distinction between use and area variances (Resp. Br. 
121. However, under Walton v. Tracv Loan & Trust Co., 97 U.249, 
92 P.2d 724 (1939), use variances were determined to be violative 
of the spirit of the zoning ordinances. If use variances are per 
se invalid in Utah, then the other standards to be applied to 
variances, ' . .rn-:=::.·:~.c 11 ;.ractical difficulties" or "unnecessary 
hardships", could only be applied to area variances. 
Having urged the court to adopt a "practical 
difficulties" standard, Respondents then failed to show where 
Richardson suffered any "practical difficulties." As Respondents 
themselves point out "whether or not the Utah Courts accept 
(Respondents' proposition regarding standards] is not necessary 
for disposition of this case. (Resp. Br. 121. Appellants 
have not yet been told ·o1hat Mr. Richardson's "practical 
difficulties" or "unnecessary hardships" were. 
Respondents argue that the "self-created hardship" 
doctrine does not appl~ since Richardson himself did not "creat~" 
the hardship. Although it is true ttat ?ichardson purchased t~e 
lot in a substandard candi~1on, the record ~akes it clear t~at 
che preceding owner divided the one acre lot, and that ?ichardson 
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:~1sed it fully aware that it was restricted (See App. Br., 
·_,-1e:--1t of Facts). Although Richardson purchased the larger 
su:clot of the original acre, the remaining one-third acre had a 
~ome already constructed on it (See App. Br. Statement of Facts 
<Ji. The effect of the variance, therefore, was not only to allow 
3 ~ome to be built on a two-third acre lot (Richardson's) but 
also to allow a home on a one-third acre lot (the prior home) 
As is well pointed out in Respondents' Brief, the strict 
39pl1cation of the self-created hardship doctrine could work an 
inJustice in many cases. The better rule is to apply the 
self-created hardship doctrine on a case by case basis and 
consider a purchase with knowledge of restrictions as a "highly 
significant fact which . . weighs heavily against the owner 
seeking a variance." Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe 
~· Colo., 369 P.2d 991 (1962). Mr. Richardson should not be 
allowed to blind himself to valid zoning regulations and ignore 
t~e consequences of buying and obviously restricted lot. 
~ornT I I. THE SMITHFIELD CITY VARIANCE PROCEDURE IS 
ILLEGAL. 
Appellants' principal procedural contention is that the 
s1stem employed in Smithfield City incorrectly endows the City 
:1unc1l with the ultimate decision making power with regard to 
riccance requests (Ap!J. 3r. 16-19). ResponC:ents claim that th·e 
~~1t:c~i2ld City system merely provides "extra" procedural 
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protections for Appellants and others similarly si~u3ted. 
Again, by contending that the City Council has 'J3ri:ic,, 
po~ers, Respondents ignore Utah Statutes. Section 10-9-12, C•a 
Code Annotated states that "t:-,e boar:: cf adjustrc,ent s'."lal 1 ';a·~·e 
the following powers:", including power to "authorize upon 
appeal. .variance. ." If, as Respondents claim, the City 
council can assume the position of the board and grant variances, 
a board of adjustments could be rendered useless. The 
legislature intended that the board have a function in zoning 
administration and review and so required that all cities wisn1nc 
to exercise zoning powers create a board of adjustments. Section 
10-9-6, Uta~ 2cde Annotated. 
As anticipated, aespondents continue to rely on 
_T_h_u_r_s_t_o_n_v_. __ C_a_c_h_e_C~o.;_u_n~t...._·1, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah, 1981) as their 
sole authority supporting their proposition that the Smithfieid 
City variance procedures are legally acceptable. They claLrn t'.12: 
because the Thurston case involved "procedural" questions, the 
principles of la·" expounded therein are "d:!.rectly on point" (Si?~ 
Resp. Br. 5). However, the enabling statute was cif:'erent in t:ia: 
case (county as opposed to city), and the entire procecure '.1as 
different (conditional use permit as opposed to variance). 
Thurston simply did not reach th? question of a variance. 
The distinction between the Thurston case and the 
?resent ~ne is ~ost clear ~~~en t~e =espec~ive statutes i~·;~!~-
are compared. In ~he T~urston case, t~e coGnt·; com~lssion ~a~ ----" 
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crr~t~o:1ary power to delegate "special exceptions" jurisdiction 
~'"' board of adjustments. Thurston, 626 P. 2d at 445, 446. The 
~tcit n ° referred to in Thurston was Section 17-27-15, Utah Code 
;nnotated, which reads in pertinent part as follows" 
"The board of county commissioners shall provide and 
specify. .general rules to govern the .jurisdiction 
of said board of adjustment." 
(ecipnasis added). There is not such provision in 
Title 10, Chapter 9 dealing with £& board of adjustments. 
"Any zoning resolution of the board of county 
~ provide that the board of adjustment ~· 
special exceptions to the terms of the zoning 
" 
Sectio:-i 17-27-15, Utah Code Annotated (emphasis 
commissioners 
.make 
regulations. 
dded). :\gain, there is no such provision with regard to 
~boards of adjustment. The statutes in question in this 
case, as opposed to those involved in the Thurston case, 
leave the Citv Commission with no discretion over the 
board's clearly defined variance powers. 
"[~]he legislative body shall provide for the appointment of 
a board of adjustment." 
~~ct1on 1 J-9-6, Utah Code Annotated (em9hasis added). 
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Section 10-9-3, Utah Code Annotaced. 
"The board of adjustment shall have the following powers: . 
• • (3) To authorize upon appeal. .variance from the t·-crms 
of the ordinance." 
Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated (a~phasis added). 
Nowhere in the City enabling act can there be found any 
implication that the Commission has power to retain jurisdiction 
over variances. The ultimate variance decision-making power 
rests with the board of adjust~ent, and that proposition is as 
"clear" from the statutory language," as was the proposition in 
Thurston "that th~ Countv Commission need not interest the Board 
of Adjustments within the power to issue special exceptions. 
" Thurston, 626 P.2d at 446. 
POINT I II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SU~MARY 
JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENTS. 
In Points IIA and II3 of Respondents' Brief, 
Respondents attempt to delineate what they feel are the standards 
of review to be employed by this Court in reviewing the Board of 
Adjustment's and District Court's decisions. The inconsistencies 
in Respondents' ar'Jllments point to the difficulty counsel for 
both parties have had in arriving at an ap?ropriate standard of 
review ?iven the 0 119rlay of a su~~ar~· judgment o~ to~ of 3 re'11e~ 
of a quasi-judicial administrative tody. 
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Pgspondents complain on the one hand that "the facts 
not ~n dispute," and that it is Appellants' burden "to bring 
,tlc1 such evidence to the Trial Court" (Resp. Br. 14). On the 
J:~er hand, they urge upon the Court the Oklahoma method for 
reviewing such cases, which specifies that "appeals from the 
~ecisions of the board of adjustment are to the District Court, 
me: the cause is tried de nova" (Resp. Br. 16). 
The proper standard of review can be determined only by 
examining the alternatives. First, if the District Court is to 
review the board's decision on a de nova basis as per Whitcomb 
·1, City of Woodward, 616 P.2d 455 (Okl. App., 1980), then the 
J~strict Court would hear the evidence for and against the 
?ariance and determine therefrom whether the board of adjustments 
~as within its discretion in granting or denying the variance. 
The de novo approach obviates the necessity of the board 
~a1ntaining a detailed record of the evidence because such a 
record is developed at the trial court level. The "presumption 
cf regularity" which the board of adjustment's decisions enjoy 
~ould be maintained since the District Court would affirm if some 
substantial evidence supported the board's decision. This Court 
:ould then review the record in the District Court and determine 
'·~e:::her the District Court's cone 1 us ions are appropriate in 1 igh t 
')f tne ~vidence adduced. 
An alternative method of review is to have the District 
~~rt r2view the ooard's decision without taking any evidence. 
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Using this methodology, the District Court would determine 
whether the ~oard ~as ~1th1n ~ts discretion ~sr~ly by r~v1e~:i~~ 
the proceedings before the board. In this case, the Supreme 
Court would loo~ to the evidence adduced at the hoard of 
adjustments level to de~ 0 rm~ne if the ~ec1sion is supported. 
No matter \~hie~ r~·;~~~ methodology is employed, three 
conditions must be met. First, there must be a record of 
evidence adduced upon wh1on tne reviewing Court can determine if 
the board abused its discretion. Second, the applicant 
(Richardson) must bear the burden of producing evidence to 
support the granting of the variance. Third, the reviewing court 
must indulge t~e ooard w1tn a ?resumption of correctness in its 
decision. If an; one of these conditions are not met, this Court 
has nothing to review or no standard by which to review it. 
Respondents claim t'.lat "there is no direct challenge 
that this case was not a proper one for summary judgment." 
(Resp. 3r. 14). The case is rio:ie for sul'lmary judgment but in 
favor of Appellants. This is so because not only are there no 
contested facts, but there are absolutely no facts, contested or 
otherwise, on the record which support t'.le variance, the boarj's 
decision or the trial court's summary Judgment. 
infer that it is Appellants' burden to produce evidence for the 
trial court or the board. ~here Respondents have failed to 
produce evidence sup9orc1ng t~e variance, t~e only jcrden =3rrie~ 
by Aprellants is to point out t~~s aose~c9 o~ e'J~~ence. 
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In Topanga Ass'n for a ~cenic Community v. County of 
.cs .i\n·.:ieles, 522 P.2d 12 (Cal., 1974), the California Supreme 
,,:rt concluded: 
"that variance boards. .must render findings to support 
their ultimate rulings. We also conclude that when called 
upon to scrutinize a grant of a variance, a reviewing court 
must determine whether substantial evidence supports the 
findings of the administrative board, and whether the 
findings support the board's action." 
Tooanga, 522 P.2d at 14, 15. The reasoning of 
t~e Court was that the findings and evidence must be on the record. 
"both to enable the parties to determine whether and on what 
basis they should seek review, and, in the event of review, 
to apprise a reviewing Court of the basis for the board's 
action. 11 
To?anga, 522 P.2d at 16. The reviewing Court 
should still "resolve doubts" in favor of the administrative 
findings and decision, but in doing so "must scrutinize the 
record." Tooanga 522 P.2d at 16. 
In the present case, there is no record to scrutinize, 
:~ere is merely a "findings" sheet which is a checklist of 
s~atutory standards to which the board (or commission) must pay 
lip service. What little factual data which are gleaned from the 
~inutes do not support the determination of the board. 
The trial Court erred in granting summary judgment. If 
• reviewed the board's decision on the basis of the evidence 
3dduced before the board, it erred because there was no evidence 
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to supoort the board's finjinys. 
deter~ine wheti1er there w2s an~' evidence to s1.1~po~t the ~oarcl'~ 
dec.::_3ion, it erred because there \1a.s co ~v1denc~ to su0~-ort t:--.·: 
board's findings at tne trial court 1°vel. ~lo ~atter ;;here the 
evidence was to be taken, it was Ric~ardson 1 s res?onsibil1ty to 
produce the evidence and not Appellants' as is implied in 
Respondents' Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Smithfield City granted a variance to Richardson. The 
variance violated the spirit of the ordinance. The property had 
no special circumstances. Richardson did not suffer from any 
difficulties or hardships absent the variance. Sy operatio!1 o~ 
Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated, the City was powerless to 
grant the variance. Furthermore, the City Commission should not 
have granted the variance. The trial Court erred in upholding 
the variance. Summary judgment was granted where t~e recor~ ~as 
almost entirely void of facts. Appellants clearly contested w~at 
few facts were adduced in the v~r1ance hearings. This Court 
should accordingly reverse the summary judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of DeceTber, 1933. 
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